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Abstract 
Recent research on political parties and ethnicity has challenged the conventional wisdom 
about ethnicity as the major factor that explains voter alignment in Africa. The paper 
maintains that the cleavage model, although modified to include ethnicity, still provides 
heuristically the best foundation for the explanation of party formation and voting beha-
viour in Africa. It points out that inconclusive and contradicting research results about the 
salience of ethnicity can be attributed to a variety of unresolved methodological and con-
ceptual problems linked to the ‘fluidity’ of the concept of ethnicity. To overcome these 
problems refined research designs and more sophisticated analytical tools are required. 
Finally, it is safe to assume that the relevance of ethnicity for the formation of party sys-
tems and voter alignment is not a uniform pattern across Africa, but will differ from one 
country to the other. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Das Konfliktlinienmodell, Ethnizität und Parteienbindung in Afrika: Methodische und 
konzeptionelle Herausforderungen 
Jüngere Forschungsergebnisse stellen Ethnizität als Erklärungsfaktor für das Wahlverhal-
ten in Afrika (südlich der Sahara) in Frage. Der Beitrag bestätigt die These, dass der soziale 
Konfliktlinienansatz in heuristischer Weise und im Hinblick auf Ethnizität modifiziert auf 
Afrika anwendbar ist und eine maßgebliche Erklärung für die Formation von Parteiensys-
temen in Afrika liefern kann. Die widersprüchlichen und wenig aufschlussreichen For-
schungsergebnisse zum Zusammenhang von Ethnizität und Wählerverhalten können mit 
einer Reihe ungelöster methodischer und konzeptioneller Schwierigkeiten erklärt werden, 
die mit der Fluidität des Ethnizitätsbegriffes verbunden sind. Um diese Probleme zu über-
winden, sind spezifische Forschungsdesigns und ausgefeiltere Analyseinstrumente not-
wendig. Grundsätzlich lässt sich mit einiger Sicherheit festhalten, dass Ethnizität für die 
Parteienformation und das Wählerverhalten nicht überall in Afrika gleichermaßen rele-
vant ist, sondern sich ihre Bedeutung von Land zu Land erheblich unterscheiden kann. 
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1 Introduction1 
Voting behaviour in Africa is predominantly explained by factors such as ethnicity, personal 
linkages, and clientelism (Hyden & Leys 1972; Barkan 1979; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; 
Van de Walle 2003; Scarritt & Mozzafar 1999; Mozzafar et al. 2003; 2005; Erdmann 2004; Pos-
ner 2005: 217-250). As indicated by a recent anthology (Berman et al. 2004), ethnicity as a so-
cial cleavage has gained a prominent place in the understanding of politics in Africa. While 
many authors seem to accept the prominence of ethnicity as a given fact, only a few have 
tried (and in different ways) to explain the relevance of ethnicity in the context of Seymour 
                                                     
1  Research for this paper is based on the intricacies and problems I encountered in the context of the following 
research projects ‘Political Parties and Party Systems in Anglophone Africa – Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Tan-
zania and Zambia’ (2003-07) and ‘Political Parties and Party Systems in Francophone Africa – Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Mali and Niger’ (2005-08); the latter project is conducted by Matthias Basedau and Alexander Stroh. I 
would like to thank the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) for funding 
these projects. 
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M. Lipset’s and Stein Rokkan’s (1967) social cleavage model. This is a model which provides 
an analytical framework for the formation of political parties and the structuring of voter 
alignment (Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999; Weiland & Erdmann 2001; Erdmann 2004). 
Most recently the idea that ethnicity is a major factor that explains voter alignment in Africa 
has been challenged. Staffan Lindberg and Minion K.C. Morrison (2007) suggest that there is 
no strong empirical evidence available for this ‘conventional wisdom’; ‘evidence’ is often as-
sumed rather than empirically provided. In fact, in many cases the conclusion that ethnicity 
is the predominant ‘motif” for the electorate is based on inferences from aggregate election 
data of the national level. However, as Lindberg and Morrison rightly point out, this kind of 
inference may entail an ecological fallacy. The pointer that the local discourse refers to an 
‘Akan’, ‘Bemba’ or ‘Kikuyu party’ does not make the kind of inference more valid. 
On the basis of individual voter interviews in Ghana, Lindberg and Morrison (2007: 34) con-
clude that ‘clientelistic and ethnic predisposed voting are minor features’ of the electorate. 
Similarly, albeit more cautious, Michael Bratton and his colleagues raise doubts – again 
based on individual survey data of the Afrobarometer from several countries – as to 
whether political parties are formed ‘primarily along ethnic lines’. They ‘suspect’ that party 
formation is ‘more pluralistic’ than ‘concerns about ethnic fragmentation would have one 
believe’ (Bratton et al 2005: 257). At the same time, they refrain from suggesting other vari-
ables for explaining voting behaviour in Africa. 
On the other hand, Kevin S. Fridy comes to the conclusion that ethnicity seems to be an ‘ex-
tremely significant although not deciding factor in Ghanaian elections’ (Fridy 2007: 302). 
Most interestingly, his analysis is also based on individual data analysis from Ghana, just as 
Lindberg’s and Morrison’s, and on a mixture of regression based on aggregate data and fo-
cus group interviews. Results from the analysis of individual survey data collected in Zam-
bia suggest a very similar conclusion: ‘Ethnicity matters for voter alignment and even more 
so for party affiliation’, but also ‘ethnicity or ‘ethno-political’ identity is certainly not the 
only, but one factor that accounts for election outcomes in Zambia’ (Erdmann 2007: 28). 
Hence we are faced with a puzzle. What accounts for the conflicting conclusions about the 
role of ethnicity for explaining voter behaviour in Africa? I suggest there are a number of 
conceptual as well as methodological issues that lie at the heart of the problem. In a first 
step, I shall revisit the Lipset-Rokkan model in order to draw out the explanatory power. 
The main point is that the model is a useful heuristic device but one that needs to be modi-
fied to be applicable to African societies. Although the model is certainly unable to explain 
electoral behaviour in its totality – nobody is claiming that – it is applicable only for some 
parts of the electorate. 
Linked to these general theoretical points and my own observations, I shall decipher a num-
ber of methodological and conceptual problems and flaws encountered in research on eth-
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nicity in relation to political party formation and party affiliation in Africa – and what 
makes generalisations so difficult. I will address several research issues starting with the so-
cial and political sensitivity of the concept. I will then raise the question whether the histori-
cal dimension of the cleavage model makes it useful for the study of political parties in Af-
rica of which many have only a short history. This is followed by an elaboration of the fun-
damental challenge how to come to grip with the complexity of ethnicity and its operation-
alisation for empirical research. Finally, the paper discusses a number of research problems 
related to the particularities of ethnic congress parties, party identification and the high 
numbers of ethnic groups in most African societies. It concludes that a refinement of re-
search concepts and instruments is necessary in order to tackle the challenge posed by eth-
nicity and lose not sight of other factors explaining voting behaviour in Africa. 
2 The Cleavage Model: A Short Review 
The Lipset-Rokkan model is, first of all, concerned with the identification of social cleavages 
and the historical sequence in which they emerged in Western Europe, i.e. the sequence of 
conflicts. The relevant social cleavages in Western Europe are the conflicts of centre versus 
periphery (subject/dominant culture), state versus church (secularization), rural versus ur-
ban (primary/secondary economy), and capital versus labour (owner/worker). The second 
topic addresses the ‘conditions for the development of a stable system of cleavage and op-
position’ in the national polity and its articulation in political parties and the particular na-
tional party system. Finally, it is the third complex which is concerned with a question re-
lated to individual (voting) behaviour within the established political party system (Lipset & 
Rokkan 1967: 1-2). 
For our purposes, the most relevant question is that about the crucial characteristics of vot-
ers mobilised by political parties. Lipset and Rokkan made it quite clear that the existence of 
a social conflict does not automatically imply a mobilisation or identification of voters along 
this cleavage. The effective mobilisation of a particular party is dependent on a number of 
other factors as well which are not grounded in social cleavages, but related to the political 
strategies of the elite. There are number of economic, social, and cultural conditions which 
support or hinder the mobilisation efforts along cleavage lines. There is no clear cut linkage 
or deterministic relationship between a social cleavage and party formation together with a 
lasting identification and mobilisation of voters. It is important to note that the model com-
bines a structural and an agency-orientated approach towards the explanation of voting be-
haviour. Hence, we need to ask what the model actually gives us. 
8 Erdmann: The Cleavage Model, Ethnicity and Voter Alignment in Africa 
- It makes it possible to empirically analyse and compare the formation and develop-
ment of political party systems in relation to social cleavages or socio-structural con-
ditions. 
- The cleavage is defined as an institutionalised, socio-structurally embedded and po-
litically effectual conflict. 
- The model comprises four dimensions: 1. a socio-structural one, 2. an interest and/or 
value oriented one, 3. a political party one, and 4. a voter alignment one. 
- The formation of a permanently institutionalised cleavage in form of a specific party 
system occurs only if the political elite takes up societal conflicts and articulates these 
issues through political parties within the established framework of political institu-
tions. 
- The repeated political articulation of these conflicts through political parties pro-
motes political identities and political party alignments and affiliations among the 
citizens and voters. 
 
Above all, the Lipset-Rokkan model emphasises the long lasting historical dimension of the 
genesis and development of party systems and voter alignment. Its scope is not restricted to 
the identification of social cleavages which might constitute the party system, but extends to 
the treatment and institutionalisation of these conflicts into more or less stable political party 
systems. 
Given this long-term historical dimension envisaged in the model and the comparatively 
short history of many political parties in Africa, especially of those formed in the aftermath 
of the ‘1989-juncture’, it may appear doubtful if the model can provide empirically 
grounded findings about voter orientation and party alignments. At the same time, there are 
a number of political parties which trace their development back for more than half a cen-
tury (see below 4.2). Therefore we are confronted with a number of older, probably more in-
stitutionalised parties and with a larger number of young, less institutionalised parties. 
These considerations suggest a first crucial qualification that under fluid political conditions, 
the cleavage model might be useful to explain the voting behaviour and party alignment of 
only a fraction of the electorate – perhaps only of a few core groups which exhibit the same 
characteristics. 
A second, more general qualification is called for. Insights on voting behaviour in established 
and institutionalised party systems suggest that party alignment cannot be explained exclu-
sively by socio-structural variables. The perception of the input and output performance of 
the political regime, the government and political parties are also important determinants of 
voting behaviour. Nowadays there seems to be a broad consensus among psephologists that 
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voting behaviour and party affiliation cannot be explained by a single model (Roth 2006: 23). 
Voting behaviour and partisanship are simply too complex for this. 
Usually, besides the sociological model, two other classical approaches are available, namely 
party identification (Campbell et al. 1954; 1960) and rational choice models (Downs 1957; 
Key 1966; Fiorina 1981) which are applied to the puzzle of voting behaviour. According to 
the party identification model, voter alignment is shaped by the perception of three factors: 
candidates, issues, and links between parties and social groups. However, the latter factor, 
the social dimension is conceptually not well elaborated. Party identification is loosely un-
derstood as a socio-psychological product of family and social group ties, and the focus of 
the model is on the functions of party identification (Dalton 2002: 20-21). It is important to 
note that party identification does not only have a direct impact on voting decisions but also 
on the perception of candidates and issues. Hence, there is a tautological twist or circular ar-
gument. To put it differently, party identification shapes the evaluation of candidates, is-
sues, and the expected capacity of parties to solve problems. 
A rational choice model cannot explain why a substantial number of voters support the 
same party at election after election despite changes in government and policy performance. 
The approach ignores the fact that political perceptions and evaluations are structured by 
‘predisposed’ partisan attitudes such as party identification. The model is not interested in 
where the voters’ values come from which coordinate decisions. However, it helps to ex-
plain the electoral behaviour for those voters with a weak or no party identification, whose 
numbers have increased in old democracies and in young democracies of Eastern and 
Southern Europe. It may also help to understand why people vote different from their party 
identification, and why they chose a candidate or how they decide on issues. A modified 
model of rational choice views the voter as ‘an appraiser of past events’ (Key 1966; Fiorina 
1981) who judges retrospectively on the past performance of the government. This modified 
model takes for granted that voters identify with parties. The major difference to the party 
identification model is, however, that the identification is determined by rational calculation 
or reflection and not by affective ties which are crucial for the party identification model. 
It has been suggested to view the sociological Lipset-Rokkan model as the backbone for the 
two other models. According to research on voter alignment in Europe, this model is still the 
best for explaining party alignment for most of the electorate despite increasing voter de-
alignment. This even applies to highly mobile societies such as post-war West Germany 
where socio-structural determinants such as capital/labour and religion/no-religion are still 
the most reliable explanans (Roth 2006: 32; Pappi 1990). 
To sum up, the rational choice model helps to explain why some citizens change their vote. 
The party identification model provides an understanding why many citizens do not change 
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their vote. Finally, the sociological model explains why people identify with particular par-
ties over a period of elections (often undisturbed by the government’s performance). 
3 The Cleavage Model and Its Application to Africa 
A fundamental question is whether the Lipset-Rokkan model based on Western Europe can 
be applied to Africa. Lipset and Rokkan never claimed that it would be directly applicable to 
other parts of the world. It is common knowledge that party and party system formation out-
side Europe differ from the model. In particular, the specific cleavages and their sequencing 
are different (Eith & Mielke 2001; Randall 2001: 258). Indeed, the cleavage model cannot be 
applied in a sequential (diachronic) but only in a heuristic manner as a synchronic model of 
party formation in Africa (Erdmann & Weiland 2001; Erdmann 2004: 44), providing a frame-
work for analysing the socio-structural conditions of party and party system formation. 
Elsewhere we have shown that none of the four classical cleavages known from the Western 
European history are politically relevant in present day Africa – perhaps with the exception 
of South Africa (Erdmann & Weiland 2001; Erdmann 2004). Some of the traditional cleav-
ages can be identified in Africa, but they are weakly developed and thus contribute little, or 
in a few cases only, to the formation of political parties and party systems. This applies, for 
example, to the capital-labour cleavage which is obviously there, but the relevant group of 
industrial workers is too small. In many countries, there are trade unions which provide the 
organisational basis for articulating the cleavage and its ‘translation’ in party politics. How-
ever, the members of these unions are mainly comprised of public employees, less so of in-
dustrial workers (again, apart from a few exceptions like Zambia). At the same time, after 
trade unions involvement with the one-party rule during the 1970s and 1980s and the de-
mocratization of the 1990s the trade union movement has split. Genuine communist or so-
cial-democratic parties have become rare, and they are usually small and irrelevant.2 
The second, urban-rural cleavage which again accompanies industrialisation has little rele-
vance in Africa in the way we know it from Western Europe. It describes the conflict of in-
terest between the mercantile and industrial bourgeoisie on the one hand, and of the feudal 
landowners on the other hand. Increasing urbanisation in Africa might provide the potential 
for a conflict between the urban and rural population (e.g. about the pricing of basic food-
stuffs). Up to now, this has not been developed into a clear cut line of cleavage and, more 
                                                     
2  The proliferation of self-proclaimed ‘social-democratic’ parties since 1989 should not be taken at face value. 
Max Mmuya has pointed out the idiosyncratic ‘mutations of social democracy and liberalism’ in the pro-
grammes of many of the Tanzanian opposition parties (Mmuya 1998: 27). 
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importantly, into specific political party formations or orientations. One reason might be 
that urbanisation, which is not linked to industrialisation in Africa, is, sociologically, to some 
degree only an extension of the village into the (shanty) town, and the urban and rural 
population maintain close personal links as well as their ethnic identity (Elwert & Segbenou 
1983; Gluckman 1960: 55; Epstein 1958). 
The state-church cleavage which was so important in Western Europe has basically no 
meaning in Africa. With the end of the colonial era, countries south of the Sahara became 
independent as secular states. Early Christian or Muslim orientated parties (e.g. in Uganda 
or Sudan) of the 1950s and 1960s were not interested in a religious state but operated as rep-
resentatives of a particular denomination or sect (tariqa). Only during the 1990s the secular 
state has been challenged by some fundamentalist religious groups (e.g. in Nigeria). This, 
however, was not accompanied by the formation of corresponding political parties. 
Finally, ethnicity has been identified as one important social cleavage in Africa. Although 
ethnicity is not addressed in the Lipset-Rokkan model explicitly, it can be subsumed under 
the centre-periphery cleavage. In Western Europe, this cleavage described the conflict about 
the dominant culture of the emerging nation state – which of the various regional cultures 
would become the nation’s state culture. Put differently, it was the conflict between various 
ethnic groups about cultural dominance in the state. In Africa, the problem is slightly differ-
ent; in most cases the conflict is not so much about the dominant culture but about who con-
trols the commanding heights of the state for the selective or particularistic distribution of 
patronage. Within the Lipset-Rokkan model this cleavage is based on the concept of ‘territo-
rial opposition’ which is explained (under the conditions of universal suffrage) as ‘the com-
mitment to the locality and its dominant culture: you vote with your community and its 
leaders irrespective of your economic position’ (Lipset & Rokkan1967: 13). In so far as eth-
nicity can be incorporated into the model, it can be utilised as one social cleavage which 
might provide the basis for political party formation and voter alignment. 
Ethnicity denotes a historically and socially constructed identity – not as a primordial or es-
sentialist attribute – and one that is multifaceted, changeable, and has multiple meanings. 
Ethnicity is constituted by the interaction of self-ascription and ascription by others (Young 
1976; Lentz 1994: 25; Lentz & Nugent 2000: 2-6). It can be comprised of several elements: 
Language, common history, values and symbols, territory or political entity. Ethnicity is not 
a question of fixed boundaries or neatly delineated entities. It is historically and regionally 
articulated in different ways. Ethnic cleavages are variable, and ethnicity can, but need not, 
lead to voter alignment. This depends on the way ethnic identities are politically developed 
– which implies different forms of cultural ideologies up to chauvinistic expressions of eth-
nic supremacy. 
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The relevance of ethnicity in African politics is hardly disputed in the literature. However, 
the crucial question is whether ethnicity provides the, or only one of a number of relevant 
cleavages for party formation and voter alignment, and how this can be analysed empiri-
cally. As Lindberg and Morrison indicate, this particular linkage is often more assumed or 
maintained but hardly substantiated by empirical facts. As we have learned from revisiting 
the Lipset-Rokkan model, a social cleavage does not automatically imply corresponding po-
litical party formation. It should be noted as well that – apart from some self-proclaimed ex-
perts – in the academic literature hardly anybody has claimed that ethnicity is the only and 
exclusive cleavage for party formation and voter alignment in Africa. It has, however, been 
suggested as the predominant cleavage (Scarrit & Mozzafar 1999; Erdmann & Weiland 2001; 
Erdmann 2004; Nugent 2004). 
4 Conceptual and Methodological Problems of Analysis 
The assumption of the relevance of ethnicity for political party formation and voter mobili-
sation is usually derived from one of the four following methodological approaches. The 
first approach is based on inferences from aggregated national elections data. In the case of 
repeated election victories of a party in a region, district, and constituency inhabited by a 
single ethnic group, ethnicity is assumed to be the major variable for explaining election out-
comes (Nugent 2004; Fridy 2007). A second, qualitative approach uses results of various in-
terviews and participatory observations at the national and local level as well as the analysis 
of newspapers and other reports. This kind of research involves national and local elites, or-
dinary citizens as well as political party members, activists and leaders. Focus-group discus-
sions and interviews are one of the techniques applied; interviews with party leaders and ac-
tivists might reveal the strategic calculations for the nomination of candidates in parliamen-
tary elections, which candidate with which ethnic affiliation might have the best chance to 
win a particular constituency populated predominantly by one ethnic group. A third ap-
proach tries to analyse (i) the ethnic composition of major government members and their 
distribution among ministers and vice-ministers to determine which ethnic groups are par-
ticipating in the government; and (ii) the government’s policy and favours towards the vari-
ous regions and districts (Hwedi 1998; Throup 2003). 
Recently, individual level data have been systematically used for statistical analyses, but 
with conflicting results. Lindberg and Morrison used a relatively small and regionally lim-
ited sample of Ghanaians for their research; in 2003 they conducted 700 interviews in six out 
of 200 constituencies and in four of 20 regions. They attributed little relevance to ethnicity: 
‘Clientelistic and ethnic predisposed voting are minor features of the Ghanaian electorate’ 
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(Lindberg & Morrison 2007: 34). However, based on a very similar research design, 600 in-
terviews in three out of 230 constituencies of three out of ten regions (2004-5), Fridy comes to 
nearly the opposite conclusion: ‘ethnicity is an extremely significant although not deciding 
factor in Ghanaian elections’ (Fridy 2007: 302). 
To make matters more complicated, using a backward stepwise logistic regression of my 
own data collected from 1,000 interviews from eight of ten randomly selected regions of 
Zambia and other socio-structural and attitudinal variables, it appears that ‘ethnicity matters 
for voter alignment and even more so for party affiliation in Zambia’ (Erdmann 2007: 29).3 
However, I also found that: 
- Ethnicity or ethno-political identity is not the only, but just one factor that accounts 
for election outcomes. 
- There seems to be only a core group of ethnic voters and ethnic party members. 
- The degree of ethnic voting can differ from one ethnic group to the other (ethnicity 
operated as the most powerful variable only for two ethnic groups and parties). 
- Not all ethnic groups identify consistently with one particular party (ibid.). 
 
Without testing and suggesting other variables, the Afrobarometer survey comes to a, per-
haps, slightly different conclusion by claiming that a more differentiated, multi-factor ex-
planation than ethnicity is required for party affiliation in Africa (Bratton et al. 2005: 257). 
All the methodological approaches mentioned above have weaknesses of their own which 
might affect the research results. The analysis of aggregate data might entail the danger of 
an ecological fallacy which arises as we use aggregate election data to make inferences about 
individual voting behaviour. If there is a constituency with a population of about 50 per cent 
of a particular ethnic group and a repeated similar percentage of votes for one party identi-
fied with this particular ethnic group, this might suggest that this party is supported mainly 
by members of that ethnic group. However, this can be completely wrong, simply because, 
based on aggregate constituency data, we do not know which individuals voted for which 
party. Even if there is a much higher percentage of a particular ethnic group in a constitu-
ency we cannot be sure who voted for which party, given the comparatively low election 
turnout of about 30 to 40 per cent of the population in many African countries.4 Only in rare 
                                                     
3  Based on a sophisticated model analysis of aggregate election data, Posner (2005: 227) comes to basically simi-
lar results , viz. that ethnic voting matters in rural areas, and that ‘the pattern of tribal voting (…) is more 
pronounced in the one-party elections than in the multi-party elections’. 
4  To give one example: A constituency might be comprised of 1,000 people of which 600 belong to group A, 350 
to group B, and the 150 people to various other groups. Given a percentage of 35 %t of the population which 
participated in the election (as in Ghana 2000) and 60 % voted for the X-party and 20 % for each Y- and Z-
party, the usual conclusion (and possible ecological fallacy) would be that probably the 60 % votes for X-
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cases, if there are hardly any other people in the constituency, might it be plausible that the 
party in question has this particular ethnic basis – but yet not proven because there might be 
other, hidden factors in the game which we do not know until we have tested them. 
The second approach is usually based on people’s opinion and often is not free from internal 
contradictions. For example, our own focus group interviews in rural Zambia seemed to 
have revealed clear results. Nobody objected to the statement of one participant, but many 
agreed with the proposition that ‘voting is tribal’.5 In Lusaka, urban participants rebuffed 
the idea and maintained that only people in rural areas vote tribal, but not in towns. 
Reports on interviews in Ghana claim that Ghanaians resolutely repudiate the idea of ethnic 
voting; after further discussions, however, some of the interviewees point out that other eth-
nic groups, apart from their own, do tend towards that kind of voting (Fridy 2007: 301f.). 
Again, our own focus group interviews produced mixed results.6 On the one hand, partici-
pants claimed that voting behaviour is ‘traditional’ – which, however, did not imply a tradi-
tional tribal behaviour but referred to the long established ideological divide between the 
Nkrumaist (leftish) and the Danqua (conservative, liberal) tradition in Ghana. Interestingly, 
neither the focus-group participants nor local political party activists and functionaries were 
able to explain the difference between the two traditions in terms that could be related to the 
classical left-right pattern with which we are all familiar in Europe. Some participants also 
mentioned that in the past people voted along ‘tribal lines’ and that even today some politi-
cians tried to appeal to ethnic identities in order to win votes. Others stated the only ‘enlight-
ened’ citizens would vote according to ‘issues’, but some would still follow what the Chiefs 
would tell them to do. However, Ghanaian political analysts clearly emphasised that ethnic-
ity is the most important variable to understand politics and voting behaviour in Ghana.7 
A similar pattern emerged from interviews with political party functionaries on the national 
and local level in a number of African countries (Ghana, Malawi, Zambia and partly Tanza-
nia) who disavowed an ethnic base for their own party, but pointed to other parties as ‘tri-
                                                                                                                                          
party came from group A – in fact, it could be completely the other way round: Group B together with the 
people of other groups, and perhaps a small number of people from group A as well, could have voted for X-
party provided, for example, a higher degree of mobilisation because of a specific (local) grievance; a more 
extensive discussion of the problem can be found in Posner (2005: 223-225). 
5  Neo Simutanyi (Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Lusaka), Matthias Basedau (GIGA 
Institute of African Affairs) and the author conducted a number of focus-group discussions with 29 partici-
pants in Chibombo (High School), Chibombo District, Central Province, 15 March 2003; in Chinyunyu (Basic 
School), Chongwe District, Central Province, 17 March 2003; and Lusaka, Longacre, 18 March 2003. 
6  The focus-group interviews were conducted 11 December 2003 in Akwatia, Kwaebibirim, Eastern Region. 
The constituency is ethnically heterogeneous with a high degree of immigrants from the North; in 1992 and 
1996 it was won by the National Democratic Congress and in 2000 by the National Patriotic Party. 
7  Interviews, Kwesi Jonah, Senior Lecturer Dept. of Political Science University of Ghana; Head of Governance 
Centre, Accra, 3 December 2003; Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Director, Ghana Center for Democratic Devel-
opment, Accra, 24 November 2003; see also Frempong 2001. 
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balist’. This is also the usual character of the national political discourse between political 
parties on which the analysis of official party statements in the national media is based 
upon: ‘Tribalism’ always refers to the conduct of others. It should be obvious that the local 
opinions about ethnicity are heavily ‘biased’ and not very reliable. 
The inter-party discourse on ethnicity could be interpreted, perhaps, as an elitist controversy 
which might have little meaning for the value orientation and behaviour of ordinary citi-
zens. Although one should not dismiss this interpretation entirely, but, given the fact of the 
widespread issue of ethnicity in the daily life of ordinary people (in many cases people can 
identify other people simply by their names) it seems to be farfetched to de-link an elite dis-
course entirely from citizens’ concerns. In fact, there is no doubt that this discourse took root 
quite some time ago. 
What obviously remains is the puzzle of contradicting statements and of inconclusive results 
which cannot easily be solved. However, based on these various observations, and despite 
the methodological problems involved in all the different approaches, one can argue that al-
together the ethnicity hypothesis could be accepted. However, this would be dissatisfying. 
In addition, the results of the individual data analysis call for some prudence and suggest a 
number of necessary modifications and further qualifications. Yet, we have to be aware that 
there are no alternative explanations for party formation and voting behaviour in Africa – 
apart from a rational choice approach which holds its own basic shortcomings and weak-
nesses especially for how it is applied for Africa. 
As regards the latter, two major works on electoral behaviour in Africa disagree fundamen-
tally on the understanding of ethnicity. While Lindberg and Morrison (2007: 7), view ‘ethnic-
ity’ as a ‘primordial’ and ‘non-rational’, Scarritt and Mozzafar (1999: 84; Mozzafar 1995) treat 
ethnicity as a ‘cost-effective strategic resource for organizing collective political action’. 
Moreover, Lindberg and Morrison (2007: 33) in their analysis of voting behaviour in Ghana 
decided to ignore 
issues of structural factors affecting voting rationale and behaviour such as class, gen-
der, age, social status, employment status and ideological orientation, in favor of a de-
tailed examination of the reasons for voting behaviour ascribed by the voters them-
selves [sic!]8 
and come to negative conclusions about the supposed ‘prevalence of family and ethnically 
predisposed voting’. This is surprising in two ways. First, most researchers would view eth-
nicity as a structural factor (just like Scarritt and Mozzafar or myself) or as ‘part of a rational 
                                                     
8  See below 4.1 on the related problem of self-identification.  
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efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization’ (Bates 1983: 152). Secondly, 
this makes the whole argument more or less unconvincing. 
Beyond these particular contradictions, there are a number of additional conceptual prob-
lems which partly explain why it might have been so difficult to find clear-cut evidence or 
rejection of the ethnicity hypothesis even on the basis of individual data. It should be noted 
that the intricacies involved are not only a challenge for large-N surveys using a standard-
ised questionnaire for the collection of individual data, but also for qualitative approaches as 
well. Before outlining the various conceptual issues involved, a fundamental issue needs to 
be addressed, and this is the social and political sensitivity of ethnicity. 
4.1 Social and Political Sensitivity of Ethnicity 
I start to address the theme with a personal anecdote. When I was a student at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies in the early 1980s, I tried to raise the question of tribalism and 
ethnicity during a seminar. My lecturer cut me short with the claim: ‘Tribalism is a colonial 
invention’. For most scholars this was the academically correct wisdom at that time, often 
with an added remark that ethnicity was politically used by the African elites to bolster their 
rule. All this is clearly correct, but did not account for the political reality of the issue. A few 
years later when I first went to Africa I was surprised by a headline of the Kenyan newspa-
per Daily Nation (October 27, 1984): ‘All tribalists to be sacked’ – and the article continued 
that, ‘President Daniel Arap Moi declared war yesterday on leaders who practise tribalism’. 
This indicated two points; first, that tribalism was an issue of daily political debate, and sec-
ond, that it was also a delicate issue to talk about in Kenya. A couple of months later, I 
learned it was a non-issue to talk about in Tanzania – indicating a variance about how eth-
nicity was publicly dealt with in different African states. Despite these differences, the usual 
reaction of African governments after independence was to stop taking stock of and count-
ing ethnic identities in their population census until today. 
Even today ethnicity is a delicate or at least a tricky social and political issue to discuss in 
Africa (as elsewhere). There seems to be no problem asking people about their ethnic iden-
tity in a straightforward way: ‘What is your tribe (or groupe ethnique)’. None of our inter-
viewers in five Anglophone and four Francophone African countries reported any trouble 
with this question – not even in Tanzania.9 This, however, provides only one, very basic or 
rather simplistic approach to the problem and, as one could argue, it might be misleading 
because it already presupposes ethnic identities. 
                                                     
9  We first tried to avoid this question by asking the respondents about their mother tongue. But many people 
seemed to recognise the disguise of this question, so we went for the proper question.  
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As has been indicated above, if one asks people or politicians whether they see ‘tribalism’ as 
a problem in their society, they often say ‘No’, but then later say that there are others who 
tend to behave in ‘tribalist’ manner. So, if we start to elaborate on the problem of ethnic 
identity and behaviour, the issue and the talk about it becomes more sensitive and compli-
cated. This, in particular, poses a problem for large-N attitude surveys with a standardised 
questionnaire. As Daniel Corstange has pointed out, sensitive issues are not only difficult to 
study, but, as illustrated above, if they are based on self-reports they tend to be ‘muddied by 
response bias’ (Corstange 2007: 2). If the answers to the questions are shaped by a response 
bias, the attitudes (and behaviour) tend to be ‘underreported in a systematic and unmeasur-
able way’ (ibid.). This is true regardless of the reasons for the response bias, which can be 
caused simply by what is presumed to be socially desirable to pure fear of various kinds of 
repression. In the end, it raises the problem of what we can make of data which might sys-
tematically misrepresent the variable ‘ethnicity’. One response could be to rephrase the 
question or to approach it from a different angle. 
A more sophisticated approach than the simple question (What is your tribe?) which ad-
dresses the problem without a presumption of ethnicity and, perhaps, in a politically less 
‘sensitive’ manner by openly asking about the identity does not make the whole issue much 
easier. The Afrobarometer used the approach of self-identification by asking ‘which specific 
group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?’ (apart from being Tanzanian, Zambian 
etc.) (Bannon et al 2004).10 The results were striking (see Table 1). While in Botswana, which 
is the ethnically most homogeneous country in the sample, ‘ethnic’ was the overwhelming 
identity, it was also true in Malawi, which has a diverse population of ethnic groups. In 
Tanzania, which supposedly used to be one of the most egalitarian societies and has more 
than 100 ethnic groups, class/occupation was the main identity. This was the case, although 
to a lesser degree, in Zambia. Interestingly, with its predominantly Christian population 
(split between Catholics and Protestants) religion also provided an identity in Zambia. In 
contrast, in Tanzania, which suffers from a dispute about whether Christians or Muslims 
constitute a majority and has had some social and political conflicts between the two com-
munities, religious identity has hardly any relevance. 
Apart from the problem of an ‘outside’ or ‘objective’ interpretation of the results, what does 
this mean for the identity in relation to cleavages and possibly party affiliation? Does it mean 
that social and political relations in Zambia are much less determined by ethnicity than in 
                                                     
10  The complete wording of the question: ‘We have spoken to many [people in this country, country X] and they 
all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, relig-
ion, race, and others describe themselves in economic terms such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. 
Besides being [a citizen of X], which specific group …?’ (Bannon et al. 2004: 2). 
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Botswana and Malawi? And is class/occupation in Tanzania more important than in Zambia 
which used to have a much broader industrial labour force and politically much stronger la-
bour movement and is much more urbanised? As Bannon et al. suggest themselves, this kind 
of self-identification is also a product of the specific national context or discourse. In Tanza-
nia, for instance, the official discourse has been couched in terms of ‘class’ for decades. 
Table 1: Selected Identities of Respondents Self-Identification 
 Botswana Malawi Tanzania Zambia 
Ethnic  92 59 3 7 
Religion  2 11 5 32 
Class/occupation 3 23 79 54 
Source: Bannon et al 2004: 4. 
It is quite clear that as much as this kind of question arises, it cannot be answered ade-
quately. It suggests, above all, that we cannot rely on this kind of self-identification for the 
purpose of finding out about voting behaviour. The major problem is that ‘identity’ is (just 
like ethnicity, see 4.4) a situational concept, and, as it has been noted by the same authors for 
ethnicity, it ‘can change – not just over the course of years, but even over the course of a few 
months, particularly at election time’ (Bannon et al. 2004: 18). If the latter point is taken seri-
ously, one cannot use the data gathered in this way without a precise knowledge of the con-
crete social and political context of the interviewees for any meaningful analysis. 
In fact, when we tried to use the Afrobarometer question in our survey we had a major 
problem in explaining the meaning of ‘identity’ in English or French to our interviewers, not 
to mention the problems in most of the local languages in which there is no adequate term 
for the word. Moreover, in Burkina Faso, following a survey in October and November 2006, 
our local interviewers reported that many Mossi responded to the question about identity 
(oral report by Alexander Stroh, GIGA): ‘What is the difference of being a Mossi and being 
Burkinabé?’ 
The final results of the survey (see Table 2) indicate the same problems and puzzle described 
above which make it hardly possible to explain the major differences of the identities in and 
between four francophone countries. In the end, we came to the conclusion that the ‘open’ 
identity question which does not presuppose a particular type of identity (either as an open 
question or one which offers a number of possible answers) and phrased in this way, does 
not solve our problem. 
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Table 2: Survey Results, Group Identities of Respondents Self-Identification, in % (2006) 
 Benin Burkina Faso Mali Niger 
Ethnic  27.4 44.6 34.8 15.9 
Religious  23.2 25.0 39.7 58.3 
Class/strata 22.2 16.0 14.1 11.2 
Others 8.1 9.0 10.7 9.6 
Valid N 80.8 94.5 99.3 95.0 
No response/Do not know 10.7/8.5 0.3/5.2 0.4/0.3 0.1/4.9 
Total N 1,022 1,003 1,026 1,008 
Source: GIGA Institute of African Affairs, Project on Parties and Party Systems in Francophone Africa (Matthias 
Basedau and Alexander Stroh, 2007). 
All this highlights not so much the social and political sensitivity of ethnicity, but an aca-
demic problem about the situational relevance, operationalisation, and the translation of a 
concept into empirical questions. 
4.2 Cleavages and Political Parties 
Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model is an ex-post construct. It covers a time span of about 
two to three hundred years in Europe – if we include the development of the cleavages be-
fore the actual articulation in political parties. In Western Europe, the cleavages took form as 
parties and party systems during the last hundred or one hundred and fifty years only; and 
the institutionalisation of the parties and party systems is of a more recent date. 
This is quite different from the situation in Africa; the time span we are concerned with is 
much shorter. The institutionalisation of societal cleavages could begin, in most cases, only 
with the forming of the polity of the new states (in the end with independence), although 
some of the cleavages developed already within the framework of the colonial state, and in a 
few cases even before. With few exceptions, the first wave of political party formation usu-
ally dates back to the 1950s and 1960s. A second wave, from which most of the present-day 
parties originate, occurred only very recently during the 1990s. 
The implication here is not that most of the present day parties have only a very short his-
tory and cannot be linked to a lasting cleavage. In fact, despite the high number of new par-
ties formed during the 1990s, in a number of countries the party formation of this period can 
be linked to patterns of party formation and the dynamics of the party systems of the 1950s 
and 1960s. This does not only extend the timeframe of analysis but suggests at the same time 
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the existence and re-emergence and development of particular social cleavages articulated in 
party competition albeit under different names. This has been shown for Zambia (Burnell 
2001) where the ruling United National Independence Party and the Movement for Multi-
party Democracy posses regional and ethnic strongholds in the northern and eastern parts 
of the country on the one hand, and the opposition parties among the ethnic groups in 
Southern and Western province on the other. This is the case in Ghana as well where the 
leaders of the two major parties explicitly claim – endorsed by many people – that the 
Nkrumah and Danqua traditions go back to the 1950s and are linked to the same regional 
and ethnic strongholds. In a different way this also applies to Kenya11 and Tanzania.12 
Nevertheless, compared to Europe, we are dealing with a short time span during which only 
a few parties had the chance to become institutionalised and, possibly, to articulate a mani-
fest societal cleavage. Hence, it can be argued that because of only a few institutionalised 
parties and party systems (Kuenzi & Lambright 2001; 2005; Randall & Svasand 2002; Erd-
mann & Basedau 2007) an analysis of voter affiliation and party membership based on the 
concept of social cleavages can hardly produce any meaningful results. The implication is 
that the concept is of little relevance for a fluid political situation such as in Africa, because it 
presupposes a considerable degree of institutionalisation which is lacking in this case. As 
indicated above, the Lipset-Rokkan model clearly states that only if the political elite takes 
up a social cleavage and articulates the issue in a politically and organisationally repetitive 
way, it can become institutionalised in the form of political parties. Only the repetitive ar-
ticulation and mobilisation of these social conflicts by political parties promotes the related 
political identities and party affiliations. The problem in Africa is that in many cases there 
was little time for this to happen and little institutionalised parties and fluid party systems 
continue to constitute the predominant feature. Consequently, because of the time factor it 
will be difficult in many cases to find empirical ground for the ethnicity hypothesis. 
                                                     
11  In Kenya, the original and ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) of the 1960s was, among other 
things, a coalition of Kikuyu, Luo and sections of other ethnic groups more or less from the centre of the 
country and originally sedentary people, while the conservative Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) 
under the leadership of Daniel Arap Moi in opposition had its strongholds among ethnic groups close to the 
borders of the country, many of them once nomads or transhumans. During the 1990s these coalitions re-
emerged but under different names; the core of the former KADU-coalition ruled under the name of Moi’s 
KANU, while the Kikuyu-Luo coalition (together with sections of other ethnic croups) turned up in various 
opposition parties which, after having formed the NARC coalition, defeated Moi’s KANU. 
12  In Tanzania, the social basis of opposition and opposition parties against the hegemonic and one-party rule of 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and Chama Cha Mapunduzi (CCM) originated in the 1960s ba-
sically from three regions: Kilimanjaro, Shinyanga and Tabora, and around Lake Nyanza, and re-emerged in 
the 1990s. 
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4.3 Overlapping Cleavages 
Closely related to the previous problem are other intricacies. In the Lipset and Rokkan 
model it was pointed out that there might be overlapping cleavages which makes political 
party organisation and voter alignments along cleavage lines difficult. Of course, this also 
poses a problem for analysis. It is easily assumed that under particular circumstances when 
the political system is still young and fluid or unstructured, and the society is confronted 
with rapid political change as during the last one and a half decade, the identification and 
analysis of permanent cleavage structures and their political articulation among the citi-
zenry becomes extremely difficult. 
Apart from a few nontypical countries such as Botswana or Mauritius, this is the situation in 
most African countries. Besides the political changes from the one-party to multi-party sys-
tems and the continuous problems of party organisation in many authoritarian or even hy-
brid regimes, rapid urbanisation contributes to the problems of fluidity as well. The little or-
ganised and highly volatile political parties and party systems in a number of countries are 
only an expression of the problem. 
4.4 Ethnicity: Conceptual Varieties and Problems of Application 
If ethnicity is not perceived as a primordial attribute, but in a constructivist sense as it has 
become common in political science, we are dealing with a very complex phenomenon 
which is difficult to investigate conceptually and empirically. Understood in the sense de-
scribed above (see section 3) as a historically, socially, and politically constructed identity, 
one has to account for the multi-faceted and changeable character of ethnicity that can have 
multiple meanings. Hence, ethnic identity can have different forms of expression or, to put it 
differently, covers different kinds of socio-political identities or societal self-consciousness 
which is moulded by social (including habitual or cultural), economic and political factors. It 
is important to note that ethnicity has various manifestations depending on the degree of 
cultural, social and political articulation and mobilisation. 
For these different forms of appearances we need adequate conceptual differentiations. This 
is also linked to the fact that ethnic identities have different historical dimensions. Some 
people have inherited their ethnic identity from the colonial era or even before that while 
others developed their special ethnic political identity only later (the Kalenjin of Western 
Kenya form such a case). This means political ethnic identities can be non-
contemporaneously articulated. Hence, the associated social cleavages have different politi-
cal manifestations. Some of the ethnic groups frequently turn up in the national political dis-
course over long periods while others are rarely noticed. This, however, is not dependent on 
the size of the group. In some countries the national political and the political party dis-
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course is couched in terms of and determined by single ethnic identities such as the Kikuyu, 
Kamba, Luo etc. in Kenya, while in other countries it is rather what we call ethno-linguistic 
groups such as the Bemba and Tonga speakers in Zambia or the Akan and Ga-Adangbe 
speakers etc. in Ghana. 
The problem of differently politicised ethnic groups has been taken up by Scarritt and Moz-
zafar who deal only with ‘ethno-political groups’. In doing so they take the issue conceptu-
ally a step forward. These groups are defined by ‘having a base in ethnic identity but con-
stantly moulded by political interaction with other groups and the state’ (Scarritt & Moz-
zafar 1999: 82-3). Ethno-political groups can be comprised of several ethnic groups and 
therefore contain ‘several levels of potential internal cleavage’ (ibid.: 84). This also means 
that cleavages can change of over time and their articulation can be situational, depending 
on the issues involved: 
Since different ethno-political identities may be invoked in different circumstances and 
at different times, ethno-political cleavages are sufficiently subject to change that ethnic 
groups which have never been ethno-political may eventually become so (ibid.: 88). 
Hence, there is no clear-cut pattern of how ethnicity structures party formation, partisanship 
and voter alignment. In other words, voting behaviour of different ethnic groups can be ar-
ticulated in different ways, and thus the explanatory power of the variable can be different 
from one ethnic group to the next. 
As mentioned above, the simple equation of ethnic cleavage, political party and voter 
alignment is not possible, and a social cleavage needs to be politicised by the political elite 
and transformed into party formation. Mozzafar et al (2003: 382) have captured the process 
in three simplified steps: ‘construction’ of an ethnic identity, its ‘politicisation’, and finally 
‘particization’ – a term borrowed from Gary Cox (1997: 26). Posner (2005) has shown how 
political institutions shape certain ethnic cleavages politically on the basis of two causal 
mechanisms. Firstly, why some of the potential cleavages become politically salient (and 
others not); and secondly, why people select one of the potentially salient ethnic identities 
(and not others). 
However, the aforementioned issue of ethnic identity is not only a conceptual problem. If we 
try to gather individual data through a standardized questionnaire for quantitative analysis, 
it also becomes a problem of self-identification of the people involved (see above 4.1). Scarritt 
and Mozzafar constructed ethnic groups based on ‘expert’s knowledge’ from data selected 
from the Minorities at Risk and Black Africa Handbook ; while the first data set identified groups 
‘at the highest politically relevant level of aggregation within a country, ignoring objective 
[sic!] ethnographic differences’, the groups of the second data set were based on ‘ethno-
graphic theory’, according to ‘identity and cultural ties’ that define ethnic identity groups as 
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‘sharing identity, similar institutions, and value premises’. Enriched with additional informa-
tion, for example about electoral competition in the countries concerned, Scarritt and Moz-
zafar combined these data sets for the construction of ‘ethno-political groups’. 
However, the question is, do people identify with these groups and to what degree? And 
how can we ask them, in order to get useful answers? What about people who clearly do not 
identify with some of these groups? Again, we are confronted with the problem that ethno-
political identities are situational. Since ethno-political groups are often comprised of several 
ethnic groups, it is easy to assume that not all identify in the same way with the larger 
ethno-political group. To give an example, if viewed from the southern perspective of the 
Tonga speakers, the Mambwe of northern Zambia belong to the Bemba speakers.13 But they 
differ from the Bemba proper, and, as a non-Bemba pointed out, they ‘identify with Bembas 
only when it suits them’ – which they indicate, for example, by demanding a region for their 
own. So we are again confronted with a problem of different degrees of both ethnic and po-
litical identity. 
To answer these questions, highly sophisticated questionnaires which allow to distinguish 
between different degrees of ethnicity are necessary. But this poses the ‘awkward metric 
problem’ (Corstange 2007) (which exists in any case with this kind of non-metric variable for 
statistical analysis) and limits the analytical methods that can be applied. 
4.5 Ethnic Congress Parties 
Following Horowitz (1985), I distinguished two types of ethnic based parties, the ethnic 
party and the ethnic congress party (Erdmann 2001; 2004). The ethnic party is based on one 
ethnic group, while the ethnic congress party is based on several such groups and is in a 
sense a multi-ethnic party. In most African countries, the ethnic party is rare, while the eth-
nic congress party is the rule. The reason for that phenomenon is quite simple. In most coun-
tries there are high numbers of ethnic groups, but the majority of these groups are small in 
terms of population. The number of most ethnic groups is simply too small to gain a mean-
ingful representation in parliament, not to speak of a majority for forming a government or 
becoming a blackmail power (Sartori 1976: 122-3; 1994: 34). This suggests itself for coalition 
building even before party formation. 
As a result, the members of a number of ethnic groups will vote for such a congress party – 
which again makes it difficult to identify the party with one particular group. Moreover, 
some ethnic groups or sub-groups tend to change their party allegiance from election to 
                                                     
13  For our statistical analysis (Erdmann 2007) we used the responses to the simple ‘tribal question’ and com-
bined these to the larger ethno-political groups; only on this level we got some significant results.  
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election, depending on the behaviour of the groups’ leaders. Over time, regardless of the 
kind of aggregate or individual data used, this makes it very difficult to identify ethnic ori-
entated voter alignment. So the problem involved is very similar to that of the ethno-
political groups. 
4.6 Ethnicity-Political Party Identification 
The problem of the identification of an ethnic group with a political party is closely inter-
woven with the previous issue. Although some parties are multi-ethnic congress parties 
they are identified with one particular ethnic group. The Movement for Multi-Party Democ-
racy (MMD) in Zambia is, for example, associated with the Bemba speakers (‘Bemba party’); 
the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) with the Chewa; the National Peoples’ Party (NPP) in 
Ghana with the Ashanti or the Akan speakers (‘Akan party’). However, not all ethnic groups 
are explicitly identified with one party. This usually applies to most of the smaller ethnic 
groups. This is the nature of the multi-ethnic congress party. One implication is – due to the 
nature of a coalition as well as of non-identification – that members of the elite can switch 
their allegiance with the party from election to election. The whole group or only parts of it 
can be affected (see next section). Hence we are faced with the problem that we cannot es-
tablish a fixed or institutionalised and lasting relationship between a political party and the 
particular ethnic group. The Lozis in Zambia are a case in point. During the Third Republic 
a number of different parties were successful in their region of western Zambia – big multi-
ethnic parties as well as single ethnic parties. In eastern Zambia there is a similar problem. 
Here the various ethnic groups did not vote for one party but split their votes among differ-
ent parties and at the same time changed it from one election to the next. Alexander K. D. 
Frempong (2001) also points to the problem of changing political party alliances for small 
ethnic groups in Ghana. 
4.7 Political Elite-split 
As already indicated, neither ethnic elites nor ethnic groups behave in politically corporate 
or homogenous way. Within an ethnic elite internal divisions and conflicts can emerge. 
These divisions among regional sub-groups might entail different and changing voting be-
haviour, party affiliations, party alliances and party membership. If ethnic subgroups vote 
differently and affiliate with other parties from one election to the next, the evidence of eth-
nic voting becomes difficult. A few examples of divergent voting behaviour within ethnic 
groups have been mentioned above. A case in point are the splits among the Kikuyu in 
Kenya. Two sub-groups in Murang’a and Nyeri District were affiliated with two different 
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former opposition parties, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili (FORD-A) and 
the Democratic Party (DP), while a third sub-group in Kiambu District used to be in large 
parts associated with the former ruling party KANU during the 1990s and up to date (see 
also Throup 2003). Because of intra-ethnic divisions among the elite, the voters are mobilised 
along different political party lines. Hence we are faced with a situation in which people of 
one ethnic group do not affiliate with one particular party, but ethnic sub-groups (might) 
do. This means we have to deal with different identities, making analysis more difficult. 
4.8 Number, Size and Spatial Spread of Ethnic Groups 
With the exception of a few countries, most African societies are characterised by a high 
number of ethnic groups of different sizes. Only in Botswana, Namibia, Burundi, and 
Rwanda do we find an ethnic group that counts for a large portion or even for a majority of 
the population. And even in these cases the main group can be broken down into smaller 
sub-groups. In most African countries, none of the ethnic groups can claim majority status. 
For example in Zambia the official count is more than 70 ethnic groups, while in other coun-
tries such as Tanzania the number is twice as high with more than 130 ethnic groups. On the 
other hand, Malawi has only eleven groups. 
Hence, we are confronted with a sample size problem if we want to conduct a representative 
survey which might include all ethnic groups. In case of a sample of 1,000 persons in Zam-
bia we would be left with 14 individuals from each ethnic group. The number of cases is just 
too small to make reliable inferences. To increase the sample size to 2,000 would not make a 
major difference, except for the costs. 
However, in countries with such a high number of ethnic groups it is not only very difficult 
to include all ethnic groups (cost factor), but also of questionable relevance. The small size of 
the groups may mean that they can be ignored. This means only large ethnic groups or the 
large ethno-political groups will be significant in our statistical analysis. At the same time 
we might be confronted with the problem of smaller subgroups with different political party 
affiliations. 
Perhaps, at minimum three different factors might be required at the same time that allows 
for ethnicity to show up significantly in statistical analysis of individual data: 
1) Identification of one ethnic group with one party. 
2) A relative large size of the ethnic group involved. 
3) A high degree of political unity among the political elite of the ethnic group.14 
                                                     
14  This conclusion is based on the analysis of the situation in Zambia (Erdmann 2007). 
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Another complication for the analysis is posed by the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. 
For example, due to historical migration patterns, the Ngoni in Malawi do not live in one or 
in adjacent areas, but wide apart from each other in Northern and Central Region, and they 
seem to vote for different parties. A similar situation can be found in Zambia where most of 
the Lundas live in Northwestern Province but also in substantial numbers in Luapula Prov-
ince. The problem here is basically the same as indicated with regard to the elite-splits. 
5 Conclusion 
As regards the debate about the crucial role of ethnicity for an understanding of voting be-
haviour in Africa, I maintain that Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model – used heuristically – 
still provides the best foundation for the analysis of party formation and voting behaviour. 
No doubt, the model needs to be modified in order to accommodate ethnicity as a social 
cleavage, and to be complemented by other approaches. The argument is that there is no 
other social cleavage that can be deducted from any theoretical or model based considera-
tions apart from ethnicity. Even rational choice approaches, which could provide a possible 
alternative explanation for voting behaviour, include ethnicity in their argument. Yet others 
dispute the relevance of ethnicity and construct their argument about ethnicity (primordial) 
in an inconclusive and thus unconvincing way. In the end the debate may be viewed as an 
argument about the degree in which ethnicity matters for voter alignment. 
There are, however, a number of unresolved methodological and conceptual challenges 
which make it difficult to come up with more precise and more conclusive results. One fun-
damental challenge is the fluid nature of the political parties and the political system as a 
whole. This makes the application of the cleavage model problematic since its usefulness is 
restricted to structured or institutionalised parties and party systems. The other basic chal-
lenge is the conceptual ‘fluidity’ and situational character of the ethnic identities which can 
manifest themselves in various ways. How can the different articulation or appearance of 
ethnic identities be operationalised and ‘measured’ for the collection of individual data by 
using a standardised questionnaire? 
Until today we have used only data which referred to a particular point in time. What could 
be helpful would be proper panel surveys in order to trace possible individual changes over 
time. Other research desiderata would be a careful and systematic combination of different 
research methods and also more refined designs. This is not so much a problem of more so-
phisticated analytical tools, but, above all, a challenge for the refinement of data collection 
methods. For example, Daniel Posner (2005) combined the analysis of aggregate data with a 
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survey of campaigning and candidates’ ethnic identity, but was not able to undertake a 
large-N survey. I was able to apply the latter combined with an aggregate data analysis of 
strongholds, but did not consider the candidate identity or campaigning. 
What we can safely assume from the conceptual as well as from empirical findings is that the 
significance of ethnicity will be different from one country to another in Africa; there will be 
no universal pattern of the significance of ethnicity across Africa. And even within one coun-
try we need to be aware that ethnicity might be of different relevance for one party to the 
next. As it currently stands it seems that the degree to which ethnicity can explain voting be-
haviour depends on issues of ethnicity itself such as the specific constellation of ethnic 
groups, the development of ethnic cleavages, and its particular articulation in the party sys-
tems which are all different in each country. We should, therefore, take a very guarded stance 
against any generalisation about the role of ethnicity in explaining party affiliation in Africa. 
Further efforts to improve our research tools should concentrate on a more sophisticated op-
erationalisation of ethno-political identities in order to get more ‘responsive’ items and a dif-
ferentiation of various degrees of ethnicity. Another challenge is to consider the situational 
character of identities – not only to the ethnic but possible other social and political identities 
as well. 
This leads to the final point. While focusing our research on ethnicity we should better not 
lose sight of other factors that might explain voting behaviour. Hence, the we should concen-
trate on the more general question of ‘What makes the voter tick?’. 
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